Presumptions in Political Economy

Presumptions in Political Economy

Auteur : Peter J. Boettke, Peter T. Leeson

Date de publication : 2015

Éditeur : SSRN

Nombre de pages : 31

Résumé du livre

We conceive of political economy, historical and contemporary, as reflecting sometimes competing and other times complementary assessments of the appropriate role of the state in economic life grounded in alternative approaches to the paradox of government. We call these differing approaches and the conclusions they generate political-economic presumptions. This introduction is devoted to, in broad and sweeping terms, describing the major presumptions that have characterized political economy since the field's inception. Our chief division has three parts: what we call the “laissez-faire presumption,” which dominated political economy in the 18th and early 19th centuries; the “market-failure presumption,” which dominated political economy from the late 19th until the mid-20th century, and the “government-failure presumption,” which broke the domination of the market-failure presumption in political economy in the latter 20th century. Additionally, we consider a fourth political-economic presumption we call the “anarchy presumption.” Unlike the other presumptions we consider, the anarchy presumption is not an established political-economic approach. However, it offers an interesting and, we think, important alternative deserving of further consideration by contemporary political economists.

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