An Empirical Investigation of Governance Mechanism Choices In Service Outsourcing

Résumé du livre

Purpose - Drawing on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory and Organizational Information Processing Theory (OIPT), this study investigates how the alignments between the characteristics of service (i.e., task complexity and measurement ambiguity) and governance mechanisms (i.e., contract specificity and monitoring) can affect service performance. Design/methodology/approach - The paper uses a rigorously designed survey to collect data from professionals who manage service outsourcing contracts in various industries. The respondent pool consists of randomly selected members of the Institute of Supply Management (ISM). Our research question is analyzed using 261 completed and usable responses. Structural equation modeling is adopted to examine the data and test the proposed hypotheses. Findings - We find that both contract specificity and monitoring have a positive impact on supplier performance. Further, for high task complexity services, contract specificity is more effective than monitoring, and for high measurement ambiguity services, the opposite is true. Moreover, the effect of contract specificity is mediated by monitoring.Practical implications - Service outsourcers should use both contract specificity and monitoring in governing outsourced services and know that the former depends on the latter during execution. Facing resource constraints, they can prioritize crafting detailed contract provisions over implementing monitoring for highly complex services but consider monitoring as the primary governance tool in services whose outcomes are difficult to measure.Originality/value - This study is the first to couple TCE with OPIT and consider the nature of outsourced services in the choice of governance mechanisms and empirically test the simultaneous effects of contract specificity and monitoring in the context of service outsourcing.